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I. INTRODUCTIONT HIS Article surveys significant developments in intellectual prop-
erty (IP) law in the past year.' While we focus on case law that is
precedential in the Fifth Circuit, we also review IP law develop-
ments that are likely to have an economic impact on Texas or be influen-
tial in the evolution of Texas IP jurisprudence. Thus, the cases cited focus
on the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Courts of Ap-
peals for the Fifth and Federal Circuits. For developments in trademark
and copyright law, the Fifth Circuit's authority is binding, but other cir-
cuits, such as the Second and Ninth, are considered highly persuasive.
Because all cases concerning a substantive issue of patent law are ap-
pealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, decisions
from that court during the Survey period are also included in this article.
While lacking the landmark cases of previous survey periods, such as
the 2008 period's Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.,2 and the
2007 period's KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,3 the 2009 period wit-
nessed significant developments in IP law and once again established the
importance of IP in our economy. Courts throughout the country
weighed in on IP issues with considerable potential economic impact,
such as the constitutionality of the governmental arm that sets the com-
pulsory licensing terms for the digital transmission of sound recordings
under the copyright laws, the proper test for fraud on the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) under the trademark laws, and the scope of in-
fringement damages under the patent laws. The patent "rocket docket"
of the Eastern District of Texas continued to wrestle with the impact of
the Fifth Circuit Court's venue transfer provisions on the district's status
as a favored venue for patent litigation. In addition, courts, including the
Supreme Court, set the stage to resolve fundamental issues of copyright
and patent law, such as whether registration of a copyright is a jurisdic-
1. The views expressed in this Article are the views of the individual authors and are
not necessarily those of Haynes and Boone, LLP, its attorneys, or any of its clients.
2. 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (applying the patent exhaustion doctrine to method claims).
3. 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (overruling the Federal Circuit's rigid application of the teach-
ing-suggestion-motivation test for patent obviousness).
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tional prerequisite to an infringement action,4 the proper scope of patent-
able subject matter,5 and the written disclosure required to receive a
patent.6
II. PATENT UPDATE
A. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PATENTABILITY PARADIGM-IN
RE COMISKEY, IN RE FERGUSON, AND PROMETHEUs LABORATORIES,
INC. V. MAYO COLLABORATIVE SERVICES
The Federal Circuit continued to consider and define the scope of pat-
entable subject matter following its 2008 decision, In re Bilski,7 and its
2007 decisions, In re Nuijten8 and In re Comiskey.9 First, the court indi-
cated a willingness to further contract what constitutes patentable subject
matter in a revised opinion issued in In re Comiskey.10 Next, in In re
Ferguson, the court definitely found that the only test for what constitutes
a patentable process is the machine-or-transformation test announced in
Bilski." Finally, the court applied the machine-or-transformation test
and determined that a method for calibrating a drug dosage was patenta-
ble in Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services.12 Ironi-
cally, the Prometheus method is strikingly similar to the method that
Justice Breyer considered unpatentable in his dissent to the 2006 dismis-
sal of certiorari in Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite
Laboratories, Inc.-a dissent that is perhaps the impetus for the Federal
Circuit's current efforts to define and contract the scope of patentable
subject matter.13 Now, the Supreme Court is set to weigh in on the issue,
having granted certiorari and heard oral arguments in the Bilski case. 14
In the revised In re Comiskey opinion (Comiskey II), the Federal Cir-
cuit retreated from statements in its 2007 opinion concerning the patent
eligibility of machine-implemented mental processes under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 and the link between patent eligibility under § 101 and obviousness
4. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 129 S. Ct. 1523 (2009) (granting certiorari on the
issue of whether 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) "restrict[s] the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal
courts over copyright infringement actions").
5. See Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009) (granting certiorari on the issue of the
proper test for a patentable method).
6. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 595 F.3d 1329, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (grant-
ing en banc review on "[w]hether 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1, contains a written descrip-
tion requirement separate from an enablement requirement").
7. 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S.
Ct. 2735 (2009).
8. 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
9. 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007) [herinafter Comiskey 1].
10. 554 F.3d 967, 981-82 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc) [Comiskey II].
11. In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed, 77
U.S.L.W. 3680 (U.S. June 2, 2009) (No. 08-1501).
12. 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3454 (U.S. Oct.
22, 2009) (No. 09-490).
13. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 134-39
(2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
14. See Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009).
6552010]
SMU LAW REVIEW
under § 103.15 As it did in the original opinion, the court rejected the
claims to a "method for mandatory arbitration" as directed to unpatent-
able subject matter because the method operates on human intelligence
alone.' 6 Noticeably absent from the revised opinion, however, are the
court's 2007 statements that: (1) "the combination [of an unpatentable
mental process and a machine] may produce patentable subject mat-
ter,"' 7 and (2) "[tlhe routine addition of modern electronics to an other-
wise unpatentable invention typically creates a prima facie case of
obviousness."18
Comiskey II may foreshadow a further contraction in what constitutes
patentable subject matter. The Comiskey I court determined that the
claims to a system of mandatory arbitration comprising a number of dis-
crete functional "modules" were directed to patentable subject matter be-
cause of the addition of a machine (the modules).' 0 Likewise, the court
deemed claims to a "method for mandatory arbitration" that included a
communication-means access step as directed to patentable subject mat-
ter.20 The court originally remanded the system and communication-
means claims for the Patent Office to determine "whether the addition of
general purpose computers or modem communication devices to Comis-
key's otherwise unpatentable mental process would have been non-obvi-
ous to a person of ordinary skill in the art." 21 The court failed to do so in
the revised opinion. Instead, the court remanded for the Patent Office to
determine if these claims "recite patentable subject matter under
§ 101."22
The Federal Circuit clarified that the machine-or-transformation test
announced by the Supreme Court in In re Bilski is the "'sole,' 'definitive,'
'applicable,' 'governing,' and 'proper' test for [the patentability of] a pro-
cess claim under § 101."23 Further, the court noted that there is not a
separate "business method" class of statutory subject matter and that to
be patentable, a business method, like any process claim, must pass mus-
ter under the machine-or-transformation test.24 Ultimately, the court de-
termined that the claims to a "method of marketing a product" were not
patentable under § 101, as they neither were tied to a machine ("any con-
crete parts, devices, or combination of devices"), nor transformed any
15. Comiskey II, 554 F.3d at 969 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc) (revising Comiskey I). The
revised opinion was issued pursuant to an en banc grant limited to the purpose of replacing
the original opinion. In re Comiskey, No. 2006-1286, 2009 WL 68845, at *1641 (Fed. Cir.
Jan. 13, 2009).
16. Comiskey II, 554 F.3d at 980-81; Comiskey 1, 499 F.3d 1365, 1368-69, 1378 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
17. Comiskey 1, 499 F.3d at 1379-80 (citing State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin.
Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
18. Id. at 1380.
19. Id. at 1379-80.
20. Id. at 1379.
21. Id. at 1380-81.
22. Comiskey II, 554 F.3d 967, 981 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
23. In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
24. Id. at 1365.
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article ("physical objects or substances" or abstractions "representative
of physical objects or substances"). 25
The Ferguson court also determined that the claims to a particular busi-
ness structure for a software marketing company, the "paradigm for mar-
keting software," did not fall into any of the four § 101 subject-matter
categories. Relying on In re Nuijten, the court held that the claimed busi-
ness structure was not a process, a manufacture, or a composition of mat-
ter.2 6 Indeed, Ferguson did not argue that the business structure is any of
these, but rather that it is a physical thing analogous to the fourth § 101
category-a machine. The court made it clear that a company is not a
machine; it is not "'a concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain
devices and combination of devices' "27-even Ferguson conceded that
"you cannot touch [a] company." 28
In contrast with the unpatentable (business) methods in Comiskey and
Ferguson, the court in Prometheus Laboratories determined that a medi-
cal method for calibrating drug dosage was patentable subject matter.29
The patents at issue claimed methods comprising the administering of a
drug with a particular component, using any test to determine the level of
the drug's metabolite in the subject, and interpreting the efficacy of the
dosage based on the determined metabolite level.30 The court held that
the claims satisfied the machine-or-transformation test because the ad-
ministering step transforms the human body, and the determining step
necessarily transforms the metabolites.31 Upon introduction of a drug,
"the human body necessarily undergoes a transformation"; therefore the
administering step transforms the human body.32 Although the deter-
mining step does not recite the process by which the metabolite level is
measured, such a level "cannot be determined by mere inspection," and
the process must involve some form of manipulation that necessarily
transforms the measured substance.33 Both of these transformations are
central to the purpose of the claims.
Ultimately, the future of the Federal Circuit's patentable-subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction will be determined by the Supreme Court in Bilski v. Kap-
25. Id. at 1364 (citations omitted).
26. Id. at 1366.
27. Id. at 1366 (quoting In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
28. Id. (citations omitted).
29. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
30. Id. at 1339. Compare this with the claimed process in Lab. Corp. involving
a process for helping to diagnose deficiencies of two vitamins, folate and
cobalamin. The process consists of using any test (whether patented or un-
patented) to measure the level in a body fluid of an amino acid called homo-
cysteine and then noticing whether its level is elevated above the norm; if so,
a vitamin deficiency is likely.
Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 548 U.S. 124, 125 (2006).
31. Prometheus Labs., 581 F.3d at 1345-46.
32. Id. at 1346.
33. Id. at 1347.
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pos. 3 4 Comments made by the Justices during oral argument may
foreshadow a bleak future for business method patents. For example,
Justice Sotomayor noted the potential negative impact of the Federal Cir-
cuit's machine-or-transformation test on the computer and biomedical in-
dustries and queried whether it would be better to simply state that
business methods are not patentable.3 5 Justices Kennedy, Stevens, and
Breyer were skeptical of considering a common machine implementing a
new process, like a computer running a program, as patentable subject
matter when the process itself would not be.3 6 According to Justice
Breyer, doing so would mean that "all the business patents are all right
back in."37 Perhaps the most revelatory comment belonged to Justice
Ginsburg: "[b]ut this case could be decided without making any bold
steps." 38
B. A BUG IN THE OINTMENT-IN RE GENENTECH, IN RE HOFFMANN-
LA ROCHE INC., IN RE NINTENDO, AND IN RE VOLKSWAGEN
OF AMERICA
The Eastern District of Texas continues to feel the effect of the Fifth
Circuit's venue-transfer case, In re Volkswagen of America, Inc.,39 and the
Federal Circuit's application of that case in a patent-infringement suit, In
re TS Tech USA Corp.40 The Federal Circuit seems inclined to mandate
transfer of venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), absent a concrete connection
between the Eastern District and a party, a witness, or the evidence, re-
gardless of whether the district is centrally located geographically. One
exception to the court's take on venue transfers is that it may not require
a transfer if more than one case involving the same patent is pending in
the district.
Even if a district is the most centrally located of the competing venues
with respect to the potential witnesses, absent a specific witness tie to the
district, the fact that some witnesses reside in the other venue weighs in
favor of transferring the case. For example, the court in In re Genentech,
determined that the district court erred in evaluating which of the two
venues was more convenient to witnesses scattered throughout the
United States and Europe.41 Specifically, the Eastern District erred in
considering its central location and the convenience of all potential wit-
nesses when no witness resided in the Eastern District of Texas. 42 Be-
cause some witnesses resided in the Northern District of California and
34. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009) (granting certiorari on the issue of the proper
test for a patentable method).
35. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Bilski v. Kappos, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009) (No.
08-964).
36. Id. at 41-46.
37. Id. at 46.
38. Id. at 47.
39. 545 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
40. 551 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
41. In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338, 1343-45 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
42. Id. at 1344.
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none resided in the Eastern District of Texas, the location of the wit-
nesses favored transfer to the California venue.43 In In re Hoffmann-La
Roche Inc., the court instructed that transfer is favored to a venue that
has absolute subpoena power-subpoena power with respect to both
depositions and trial-over some witnesses when the original district
court does not have absolute subpoena power over any witnesses.44 Al-
though the potential witnesses were located throughout the United States
(including one in Texas) and Europe, the fact that the Eastern District of
North Carolina had absolute subpoena power over at least four witnesses
and the Eastern District of Texas did not have absolute subpoena power
over any witness weighed in favor of transfer to North Carolina.45
Similarly, transfer to a venue in which some of the evidence is located
is favored, regardless of the central geographic location of either venue.
The court rejected the notion that the physical location of evidence
should not be a substantial factor in the venue-transfer analysis in this
"era of electronic storage and transmission" in In re Genentech,46 and
disregarded the central-location theory with respect to evidence in In re
Nintendo Co.4 7 The In re Genentech panel held that because the Califor-
nia-based defendants would be significantly and unnecessarily burdened
in transporting documents to Texas from California and the German
plaintiff would be only "slightly more" burdened in transporting docu-
ments to California instead of Texas, the location of the evidence weighed
in favor of transfer to the Northern District of California. 48 As most of
the evidence in In re Nintendo was either in Washington or Japan and
none was in Texas, the location of the evidence heavily favored transfer
from the Eastern District of Texas to the Western District of Washing-
ton.4 9 In fact, given the nature of patent infringement litigation in which
"the bulk of the relevant evidence usually comes from the accused in-
fringer," the court favors venue at the location of the defendant's
documents.50
A plaintiff cannot establish favorable venue simply by moving evidence
into that venue when it would not have done so absent the litigation.
Novartis, the California-based plaintiff in In re Hoffman-La Roche, sent
75,000 pages of electronic documents related to its patented invention to
the office of local counsel in the Eastern District of Texas, prior to filing
suit.51 The court rejected the notion that this evidence was located in the
43. Id. at 1345. The court of appeals also noted that the European-based witnesses
will have to "travel a significant distance no matter where they testify." Id. at 1344.
44. In re Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 587 F.3d 1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
45. Id. at 1335, 1338.
46. 566 F.3d at 1345-46 (quoting Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH. v. Genentech,
Inc., 607 F. Supp. 2d 769, 777 (E.D. Tex. 2009)).
47. 589 F.3d 1194, 1199-1200 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
48. In re Genentech, 566 F.3d at 1346.
49. In re Nintendo, 589 F.3d at 1199-1200.
50. In re Genentech, 566 F.3d at 1345 (quoting Neil Bros. Ltd. v. World Wide Lines,
Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 325, 330 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)).
51. In re Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 587 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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Eastern District of Texas, treating the "Texas-nature" of the documents
as a "fiction which appears to be [sic] have been created to manipulate
the propriety of venue."52 Such an attempt to manipulate venue is clearly
prohibited by Supreme Court precedent.53
A plaintiff cannot avoid transfer of venue simply because the trans-
feree court lacks jurisdiction over it or because the defendant moving for
transfer has been a plaintiff in the original venue in the past.54 In di-
recting transfer to the Northern District of California, the Genentech
panel disregarded the issue of the Northern District's questionable juris-
diction over Sanofi. In a venue-transfer analysis, the only personal juris-
diction consideration is whether the court has jurisdiction over the
defendants.55 Likewise, the Genentech panel rejected the argument that
the fact that Genentech had previously found the Eastern District of
Texas proper for filing a suit weighed against transfer. Where the previ-
ous case involved different "parties, witnesses, evidence, and facts," it is
irrelevant to the transfer analysis.56
Consideration of judicial economy seems to be the one limit on the
court's propensity to mandate transfer of venue in an Eastern District of
Texas patent infringement action. In an infringement action brought by
MHL, a Texas-based company operating out of Michigan, against twenty-
two automotive companies, including Volkswagen, variously based in Eu-
rope, Japan, South Korea, and a number of states, including Michigan but
not Texas, the Federal Circuit denied a petition for writ of mandamus
seeking transfer to the Eastern District of Michigan.57 MHL brought a
second infringement suit against an additional eight automotive compa-
nies, all based outside of Texas.58 As in In re Genentech, In re Hoffinann-
La Roche Inc., and In re Nintendo Co., the Eastern District of Texas de-
nied the defendant's motion to transfer venue. But in this instance the
district denied the motion, at least in part, in the interest of conserving
judicial resources by having one court deal with the patent issues com-
mon to both cases.59 In denying Volkswagen's petition for mandamus,
the Federal Circuit noted that "[i]n this case, the existence of multiple
lawsuits involving the same issues is a paramount consideration when de-
termining whether a transfer is in the interest of justice."60 The Eastern
District of Texas's denial of the motion to transfer venue was rational and
not a clear abuse of discretion.61
52. Id.
53. Id. (citing Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 625 (1964)).
54. In re Genentech, 566 F.3d at 1346.
55. Id.
56. See id.
57. In re Volkswagen of Am., 566 F.3d 1349, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
58. Id.





C. PLAUSIBLY INEQUITABLE-EXERGEN CORP. V. WAL-MART
STORES, INC.
In Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the Federal Circuit limited
the availability of the affirmative defense of inequitable conduct by re-
quiring the party asserting the defense to plead facts plausibly suggesting
the inequitable conduct. 62 To render a patent unenforceable with the af-
firmative defense, the party raising the defense must prove that, in ac-
quiring the patent, the applicant "(1) made an affirmative
misrepresentation of material fact, failed to disclose material information,
or submitted false material information, and (2) intended to deceive the
[PTO]." 63 The Exergen court held that Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which governs the pleading requirements for claims of
fraud, requires that inequitable conduct be pleaded with particularity. 64
Specifically, "the pleading must identify the specific who, what, when,
where, and how of the material misrepresentation or omission committed
before the PTO."65 Further, the pleading must set forth sufficient facts to
allow the court to reasonably infer the requisite state of mind: that the
applicant knowingly withheld or misrepresented material information
with the "specific intent to deceive the PTO."6 6
A pleading of inequitable conduct will fail if it does not identify who
withheld or misrepresented the information, what information was mate-
rial to which claims, where that information was located in the withheld
references, why the information was material, and how it was relevant to
the claims.67 In Exergen, the pleading failed for a variety of reasons.
First, as pleaded, "Exergen, its agents and/or attorneys" failed to identify
the particular person who withheld or misrepresented the material infor-
mation.68 Second, the pleading did not specify the material portions of
the withheld references or the claims and claim limitations to which the
information was material. 69 Finally, the pleading failed to define how the
information was material and not simply cumulative of other references
considered by the PTO.70
With respect to the requisite state of mind, conclusory statements or
the mere existence of contradictory facts will not pass muster. The con-
clusory statement that "Exergen was aware" of the withheld references
was not sufficient to suggest that the applicant knew of the specific mate-
rial information in the withheld references.71 "The mere fact that the
62. Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
63. Larson Mfg. Co. v. Aluminart Prods. Ltd., 559 F.3d 1317, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(quoting Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2008)).
64. Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1326-27.
65. Id. at 1328.
66. Id. at 1328-29.
67. See id. at 1327.
68. Id. at 1329.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1329-30.
71. Id. at 1330.
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applicant disclosed a reference" in another application, but withheld it in
the present application, is not sufficient to allow an inference of intent to
deceive.72 Similarly, simply pleading that Exergen's website contained a
statement that contradicted an Exergen representation made to the PTO
was insufficient to suggest that the person who made the representation
was aware of the contradictory statement.73 The facts pleaded did not
plausibly suggest that Exergen acted deliberately to withhold a material
reference or misrepresent material information. 74
D. THE LIMITATIONS OF INVIOLATE RULEs-ABBoTT LABORATORIES
V. SANDOZ, INC. AND INTERNATIONAL SEAWAY TRADING
CORP. V. WALGREENS CORP.
In Abbott Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc., the Federal Circuit settled any
uncertainty as to the test for infringement of a product-by-process claim
and stated unequivocally that a product does not infringe such a claim
unless the product is made by the process described in the claim.75 A
product-by-process patent claim is a claim to a "product defined by the
process of making it."7 6 This claim type exists to allow patenting of in-
ventions, the structure and characteristics of which cannot be adequately
described in English.77 The decision settles a conflict in Federal Circuit
precedent. Under one line of cases, the process described in a product-
by-process claim does not limit the scope of the claim.78 A second line of
cases holds that the scope of the product-by-process claim is limited by
the process.79 The en banc court adopted the second rule, overruled the
first, and affirmed that the generic version of the antibiotic cefdinir did
not infringe the product-by-process claim because it was manufactured by
a different process.80 Now, successfully asserting a product-by-process
claim requires that the patentee establish both an infringing product and
an infringing process.
In a twenty-page dissent, Judges Newman, Mayer, and Lourie noted
that this infringement standard stands in contrast to the patentability
standard, violating the "inviolate rule that patent claims are construed the
same way for validity and for infringement."8 1 The validity of a product-
by-process claim is a function of the product, not of the process. 82 In
72. Id. at 1331.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc in
relevant part).
76. In re Bridgeford, 357 F.2d 679, 682 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
77. Id.
78. Abbot Labs., 566 F.3d at 1291 (citing Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v.
Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
79. Id. (citing Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 846-47 (Fed. Cir.
1992)).
80. Id. at 1293, 1296.
81. Id. at 1317-18 (Newman, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
82. Amgen, Inc. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 580 F.3d 1340, 1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(citing Atl. Thermoplastics, 970 F.2d at 841).
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essence, "an old product is not patentable even if it is made by a new
process."83 A product-by-process claim is not valid if the product is "the
same as or obvious from a product of the prior art . . . even though the
prior product was made by a different process."84 Now, in light of Abbot
Laboratories, a product that would anticipate a product-by-process claim
if earlier does not necessarily infringe the claim if later.85
In contrast to Abbot Laboratories, the court in International Seaway
Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp. followed the adage that the tests for
infringement and anticipation are the same and lowered the bar for antic-
ipation of a design patent, holding that whether a design patent is antici-
pated is determined solely by the ordinary observer test announced in
Egyptian Goddess.86 The International Seaway court determined that the
Supreme Court's century-old rule on utility patents, "[t]hat which in-
fringes, if later, would anticipate, if earlier," applies to design patents.87
In establishing the ordinary observer test as the sole test for anticipation,
the Federal Circuit adhered to its "well-established practice of maintain-
ing identical tests for infringement and anticipation."8 8
A design patent is anticipated by a particular prior art design if the
designs are so similar that an ordinary observer would, in light of all prior
art, view the patented design as substantially the same as the prior art
design, regardless of whether the patented design incorporates the
"points of novelty" of the prior art design.89 The invalidity inquiry, like
the infringement inquiry, looks to the entirety of the prior art design as
would be visible in the "normal use lifetime" of the prior art, not just that
which would be visible in normal use following the point of sale.90 In the
dispute over whether the patentee's clog design was anticipated by the
"Crocs" design, the proper comparison is between the entire visible shoe,
both inside and out-not just that part which is visible when the shoe is
worn.91
83. Id. at 1366 (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 373
(1938)).
84. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 439 F.3d 1312, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(citing In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 697 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); see also U.S. PATENT & TRADE-
MARK OFFICE, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
§ 2113 (8th ed. Rev. 7 2008).
85. Amgen, 580 F.3d at 1370.
86. Int'l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1239-40 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (citing Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc, 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en
banc)).
87. Id. at 1239 (quoting Peters v. Active Mfg. Co., 129 U.S. 530, 537 (1889)). The
Federal Circuit noted that product-by-process claims are "one possible exception" to the
Supreme Court's rule, possibly foreshadowing a change in the validity test for a product-
by-process claim. See id. at 1329 n.4 (citing Amgen, 580 F.3d at 1370); see also SmithKline
Beecham, 439 F.3d at 1321-24 (Newman, J., dissenting) (arguing that process "limitations"
in a product-by-process claim should not be ignored in distinguishing the claimed invention
from the prior art); see also supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
88. Id. at 1240.
89. Id. at 1238, 1240; Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 670.




E. EXTRATERRITORIAL DEFIBRILLATION-CARDIAC PACEMAKERS,
INC. V. ST. JUDE MEDICAL, INC.
Following the Supreme Court's lead, as established in Microsoft Corp.
v. AT&T Corp.,92 the Federal Circuit further limited the extraterritorial
application of the patent laws, overruling its precedent that would find
infringement liability for shipping a product abroad to be used to perform
a patented method. 93 The product at issue in Cardiac Pacemakers is an
implantable defibrillator, used to detect and correct abnormal heart
rhythms. Cardiac's patent is directed to a method to correct heart ar-
rhythmia by using an implantable defibrillator to stimulate the heart.94
St. Jude Medical shipped defibrillators abroad, where they could be used
to perform the patented arrhythmia treatment. 95 The court held that St.
Jude was not liable for infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), which pro-
vides that whoever ships components abroad, to be combined in such a
way that would infringe if so combined in the United States, shall be lia-
ble as an infringer. The courts found that § 271(f) does not apply to
method claims. 96
Section 271(f) is now limited to cases in which physical components of
a patented product are supplied and, as such, cannot cover method claims
which are necessarily comprised of only nonphysical components. The
Federal Circuit noted the fundamental difference between a patent di-
rected to a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, all of which
are comprised of tangible parts, and a patent directed to a method, which
is comprised of a series of steps.97 This distinction warrants a different
application of § 271(f) to method patents than to patents in the other
three classes of patentable subject matter.98 While a method claim has
"components"-the steps of the method claim-these components are
not tangible parts that can be supplied to destinations abroad as required
by § 271(f). 99 Nor is § 271(f) implicated by supplying a tangible part that
is the product of a subset of the method steps-such would confuse the
result of the steps with the steps themselves.1oo Section 271(f), as written
and intended by Congress, does not extend to method patents.' 0 '
92. 550 U.S. 437 (2007) (holding that intangible software cannot be a component
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)).
93. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (en banc in relevant part).
94. Id. at 1352.
95. Id. at 1365.
96. Id. (expressly overruling Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil
Co., 425 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
97. Id. at 1362.
98. Id. at 1362-63 (distinguishing Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 55 U.S.
617 (2008), on the grounds that Quanta deals with the equivalence of method and appara-
tus patents strictly with respect to the application of the patent exhaustion doctrine).
99. Id. at 1363-64.
100. Id. at 1364.
101. Id. at 1364-65.
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F. DAMAGES-DEPUY SPINE, INC. V. MEDTRONIC SOFAMOR DANEK,
INC. AND LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. GATEWAY, INC.
As the push for patent reform reached a proposed statutory amend-
ment to govern the calculation of patent infringement damage awards,102
the Federal Circuit indicated its willingness to rein in excessive damage
awards. For example, in DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek,
Inc., the court clarified that recovery of lost profits on pull-through or
convoyed sales of unpatented products is inappropriate if the products
"are neither competitive with nor function with the patented inven-
tion." 103 Then, in Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., the court
held that a damage award is inappropriate unless it is supported by sub-
stantial evidence rather than mere speculation. 104 In DePuy Spine, the
court reversed a $77.2 million award based on the lost profits of pull-
through sales.105 In Lucent Technologies, the court vacated a $358 million
award as improperly based on "speculation or guesswork."106
The sale of unpatented products that stem merely from relationships
developed through the sales of patented products cannot form the basis
for a lost profits infringement award. Although DePuy may have lost
sales of unpatented products because of Medtronic's infringement, the
unpatented products were not sufficiently related to the patented prod-
ucts to be included in the lost profits calculus.107 The unpatented prod-
ucts do not compete with the patented products or have a functional
relationship with the patented products, and they can be used indepen-
dent of the patented products. The only relationship between the unpat-
ented product and the patented product is that the patented product
serves as a door-opener with a client, allowing DePuy to market the un-
patented product.108 Regardless of the fact that infringement reduces
these door-opening opportunities and, as a result, diminishes sales of the
unpatented product, there is not a sufficient relationship between the
products to justify awarding lost profits based on the lost sales of the
unpatented product.109
While royalty rates paid to license-comparable patents are relevant in
determining a hypothetically reasonable royalty rate to compensate the
patentee for the infringement, a court should not rely on licenses that are
102. See Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. § 4 (as introduced by Senate,
Mar. 3, 2009).
103. DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1333 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (quoting Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc)).
104. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The
Lucent Techs. appeal stemmed from a denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law
on the issue of damages. Id. at 1309. The Federal Circuit's ability to review a damage
award is significantly curtailed absent a motion for judgment as a matter of law on dam-
ages. See i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 857-58 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
105. DePuy Spine, 567 F.3d at 1340.
106. Lucent Techs., 580 F.3d at 1335.
107. DePuy Spine, 567 F.3d at 1333.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1334.
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not related to the specific technology at issue. In Lucent Technologies,
Lucent's damage argument relied upon a number of software license
agreements. 110 Some of these agreements were different in kind from the
royalty determined by the jury; some of the agreements were for a run-
ning royalty that is determined on an actual usage basis instead of a lump-
sum royalty that is negotiated up front, independent of actual use of the
patented technology.' 1 ' Absent evidence of expectations of actual usage
or how a running royalty is related to a lump-sum royalty, running-roy-
alty agreements are of limited probative value to a lump-sum royalty
award.112 Other agreements were either different in kind with respect to
the licensed technology, or the licensed technology could not be deter-
mined from the evidence.113 Lucent did not carry its burden in establish-
ing these licenses as sufficiently comparable to the hypothetical license
and, as such, the licenses could not support the damage award.114 The
licenses as presented, as well as the other Georgia-Pacific factors consid-
ered by the court, indicated that the damage award was improperly
"based mainly on speculation or guesswork."" 5
G. LICENSED TO SELL (AND MAKE)-TRANSCORE, LP v.
ELECTRONIC TRANSACTION CONSULTANTS CORP. AND
COREBRACE LLC V. STAR SEISMIC LLC
In a pair of cases involving the terms of a patent license, the Federal
Circuit provided some guidance for those drafting patent licenses and set-
tlement agreements.116 First, the court, in TransCore, LP v. Electronic
Transaction Consultants Corp. reiterated that an unrestricted covenant
not to sue on a particular patent includes the right to sell infringing prod-
ucts, implicating the doctrine of patent exhaustion." 7 The TransCore
court further held that an express license necessarily includes an implied
license to practice any of the licensor's other patents necessary to practice
the expressly licensed patent. 1 8 Second, in Corebrace LLC v. Star Seis-
mic LLC, the court held that, absent a clear agreement to the contrary, a
license to practice a patent inherently includes a right to have the pat-
ented product manufactured by a third party." 9 If a patentee wishes to
limit the patent license, it should expressly state the limits in the license
agreement.
110. Lucent Techs., 580 F.3d at 1327-28.
111. Id. at 1326.
112. Id. at 1327, 1330-31.
113. Id. at 1328.
114. Id. at 1332.
115. Id. at 1335 (citing Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116,
1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)).
116. State contract law generally governs license agreements. See Parental Guide of
Tex., Inc. v. Thomson, Inc., 446 F.3d 1265, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
117. TransCore, LP v. Elec. Transaction Consultants Corp., 563 F.3d 1271, 1276 (Fed.
Cir. 2009).
118. Id. at 1279-80.
119. Corebrace LLC v. Star Seismic LLC, 566 F.3d 1069, 1072-73 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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An unrestricted agreement not to sue on a patent is equivalent to a
bare license to practice the patent, including selling products embodying
the claimed invention. In TransCore, the patentee, TransCore, sued Elec-
tronic Transaction Consultants (ETC) for infringement, claiming that
ETC infringed TransCore's patent by installing and testing infringing
products for a third party. The products, however, were purchased from
a company, Mark IV, that had previously settled an infringement action
on the same patents. Under the settlement agreement, TransCore agreed
not to not sue Mark IV on the patents.120 The court held that the cove-
nant not to sue granted Mark IV the right to sell the infringing prod-
ucts. 1 21 Because Mark IV's sales were authorized by the settlement
agreement, the patents were exhausted with respect to the products in-
stalled by ETC.122 TransCore's unrestricted agreement not to sue Mark
IV restricted its ability to enforce its patents against those downstream
from Mark IV.123 Had TransCore wanted to limit Mark IV's ability to
sell infringing products, it should have expressly done so in the settlement
agreement.
A patentee is estopped from asserting an unlicensed patent if doing so
would prevent a party from practicing a patent it had licensed from the
patentee. One of the patents TransCore asserted against ETC issued after
TransCore's settlement with Mark IV and therefore was not subject to
the settlement agreement.124 Because the later-issued patent, the '946
patent, encompassed the subject matter claimed in at least one of the
patents subject to the settlement agreement-the '082 patent-practicing
the '082 patent would necessarily require infringing the '946 patent.125
Under the doctrine of legal estoppel, a party granting a definable prop-
erty right cannot later take back that for which it received considera-
tion.126 Allowing TransCore to enforce the broader '946 patent against a
Mark IV product would derogate the right to practice the '082 patent
granted in the settlement agreement, thus violating the doctrine of legal
estoppel.127 TransCore was estopped from asserting its broader patent
against Mark IV. Therefore Mark IV had an implied license to sell prod-
ucts embodying that patent, and the patent was exhausted with respect to
the products installed by ETC.128
Absent a clear agreement to the contrary, a license to manufacture a
patented product includes the right to use a third party to manufacture
the product. The Corebrace case revolved on whether an expressly
granted right to make a patented product inherently included the right to
120. TransCore, 563 F.3d at 1273.
121. Id. at 1274.
122. Id. (citing Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2115, 2121
(2008)).
123. Id. at 1275.
124. Id. at 1278.
125. Id. at 1279.
126. Id. (citing AMP Inc. v. United States, 389 F.2d 448, 452 (Ct. Cl. 1968)).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1279-80.
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have the product made.129 The license agreement granted the right to
"make, use, and sell" the products but expressly restricted the licensees
from assigning the license, sublicensing, or otherwise transferring the
"make, use, and sell" rights.130 The agreement further reserved all rights
not expressly granted. Under the "general principles of contract law," a
right to make "a product inherently includes the right to have it
made."131 The restrictions in the agreement were not sufficient to show a
"clear intent" to exclude the right to have the product made by an-
other.132 Thus, to restrict a licensee's right to have a patented product
made by a third party, the patentee should expressly reserve that right in
the license agreement.
III. COPYRIGHT UPDATE
A. INTERACTING WITH A COMPULSORY LICENSE-ARISTA RECORDS,
LLC v. LAUNCH MEDIA, INC.
The first federal appellate court to consider whether an Internet web-
casting service providing a playlist of music automatically selected within
user-defined constraints was an "interactive service" under 17 U.S.C.
§ 114(j)(7) determined that it was not.'3 3 Determining whether the web-
casting service is an "interactive service" is important, because if it is, the
service provider would have to negotiate individual licenses from the cop-
yright owner to avoid violating the owner's exclusive right to perform the
sound recording via digital audio transmission under § 106(6). If it is not
an "interactive service," however, the provider may qualify for the com-
pulsory licensing scheme under § 114(f).134 Looking to the purpose of
114(j)(7)-to protect a copyright owner from loss of sales due to alterna-
tive music distribution-the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
determined that the webcasting service was not an "interactive service"
because it did not allow the user to select music with such precision that
the user would use the service in lieu of purchasing the music.13 5
Under the court's reading of § 114, a webcasting service that does not
provide the user with sufficient control to create a predictable playlist is
not an "interactive service."' 36 Launch Media operated a webcasting ser-
vice, LAUNCHcast, that allowed a user to create custom "stations" that
automatically selected and played songs according to criteria entered by
the user. LAUNCHcast used a complicated algorithm to generate cus-
tom playlists based on, among other variables, a user's preferences and
ratings for genres, artists, and songs. The algorithm was used to create a
list of approximately 10,000 songs and select fifty of those for the playlist.
129. Corebrace LLC v. Star Seismic LLC, 566 F.3d 1069, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1073 (citing Carey v. United States, 326 F.2d 975, 979 (Ct. C1. 1964)).
132. Id. at 1074-75.
133. Arista Records, LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148, 149-50 (2d Cir. 2009).
134. Id. at 150-51.
135. Id. at 161-62.
136. Id. at 162.
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While the user's input constrained the songs selected by the algorithm, it
did so only in a very broad sense. For example, the playlist must have
included at least ten songs that were neither explicitly rated by the user
nor performed by the same artist or on the same album as an explicitly
rated song. Additionally, if the user had not rated at least 100 songs,
including songs not explicitly rated by the user but by the same artist or
on the same album as an explicitly rated song, the playlist must include
forty-five such unrated songs.137 Ultimately, LAUNCHcast was not an
"interactive service," because the algorithm ensured that the playlist was
not "so specially created for the user that the user ceases to purchase
music." 138
B. CAN THEY Do THAT?-SOUNDEXCHANGE, INC. V. LIBRARIAN OF
CONGRESS AND INTERCOLLEGIATE BROADCAST SYSTEM,
INC. v. COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BOARD
In a pair of cases dealing with the statutory licensing royalty rate for
sound recordings, the constitutionality of the rate-setting process was
called into question. Under the compulsory licensing scheme of the Digi-
tal Millennium Copyright Act, certain providers of digital audio transmis-
sions, such as satellite radio and non-interactive webcasting services, are
able to broadcast sound recordings without the express permission of the
copyright owner.139 Absent a voluntary license by the owner, three Cop-
yright Royalty Judges (CRJs) appointed by the Librarian of Congress set
the terms of the compulsory license.140 In SoundExchange, Inc. v. Libra-
rian of Congress, the performance rights organization, SoundExchange,
appealed the CRJs' royalty rate, which was set at six percent of the satel-
lite radio service's gross revenue in 2007 and rose in steps to eight percent
in 2012.141 Intercollegiate Broadcast System, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty
Board involved multiple appeals from the CRJs' terms set for webcasters.
For commercial services, the CRJs set a per-play royalty of $0.0008 in
2006, rising in steps to $0.00019 in 2010, with a $500 per year minimum;
for noncommercial services, the same terms applied except that the first
159,140 aggregate tuning hours (total hours of programming multiplied
by the number of users per hour) per month were exempt from the per-
137. Id. at 157-160.
138. See id. at 164.
139. See Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc., v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 574 F.3d 748, 753
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 114); SoundExchange, Inc. v. Librarian of Cong., 571
F.3d 1220, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 114).
140. Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., 574 F.3d at 753 (citing 17 U.S.C. §H 801, 803).
141. SoundExchange, 571 F.3d at 1222-23; Determination of Rates and Terms for Pre-
existing Subscription Services and Satellite Digital Audio Radio Services, 73 Fed. Reg.
4080, 4084 (Jan. 22, 2008) (codified in relevant part at 37 C.F.R. § 382.12). To put this in
perspective, Sirius Satellite Radio Inc. and XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc. reported 2007
gross revenues of $922 million and $1.1 billion respectively. Sirius Satellite Radio Inc.,
Annual Report (Form 10-K), at F-4 (Feb. 29, 2008); XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc.,




While the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ultimately af-
firmed the satellite radio royalty rate in SoundExchange and the web-
caster per-play royalty rate in Intercollegiate Broadcast System, it cast
doubt on whether the CRJs were properly appointed under the Appoint-
ments Clause of the U.S. Constitution-and thus on the validity of their
rate determinations. 14 3 In his SoundExchange concurrence, Judge Kava-
naugh noted that the CRJs wield executive power similar to that of "the
FCC, the NLRB, and the SEC" and that "billions of dollars and the fates
of entire industries can ride on the [their] decisions."1 44 According to
Judge Kavanaugh, although a CRJ has all the markings of a principal
officer of the United States, she is not appointed by the President as re-
quired by the Appointments Clause.145 The per curiam court in Intercol-
legiate Broadcast System also noted the Appointments Clause issue,
specifically noting that even if the CRJ is an inferior officer, who may be
properly appointed by the head of an executive department, there is
some question as to whether the Librarian of Congress is the head of an
executive department.146 The D.C. Circuit never reached the merits of
the Appointments Clause issue in either case because the issue was not
timely raised by any party. 147 Since the SoundExchange and Intercollegi-
ate Broadcast System opinions issued, Live365, a webcaster, has chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the CRJs in a declaratory judgment action
in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.148
IV. TRADEMARK UPDATE
A. THE PTO SHOULD HAVE KNOWN BETTER-IN RE BOSE CORP.
The Federal Circuit overruled the fraud-on-the-PTO negligence stan-
dard set forth by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board 9TIAB) in
Medinol Ltd. v. Neuro Vasx, Inc.,149 reestablishing the more stringent in-
tent-to-deceive standard. 150 Under the Lanham Act, a party may petition
to cancel registration of a trademark on the grounds that the registration
142. Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., 574 F.3d at 751, 754, 757; Digital Performance Right in
Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 72 Fed. Reg. 24084, 24096-97, 24099-100
(May 1, 2007) (codified in relevant part at 37 C.F.R. § 380.3). To put the per-play rate in
perspective, Joe Kennedy, President and CEO of the commercial internet-radio service,
Pandora Media, Inc., testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary that
Pandora expected that the royalty expense for 2008 would be $18 million, more than sev-
enty percent of Pandora's expected 2008 revenue. Music and Radio in the 21st Century:
Assuring Fair Rates and Rules Across Platforms: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 110th Cong. 14 (2008).
143. SoundExchange, 571 F.3d at 1222; Intercollegiate Broad.Sys., 574 F.3d at 752-53.
144. SoundExchange, 571 F.3d at 1226.
145. Id.
146. Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., 574 F.3d at 755-56.
147. SoundExchange, 571 F.3d at 1227; Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., 574 F.3d at 755-56.
148. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunction Relief, Live365, Inc. v. Copyright Roy-
alty Bd., No. 1:09-cv-01662 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 2009).
149. 67 U.S.P.Q.2d 1205 ( ITAB 2003).
150. In re Bose Corp., 580 F.3d 1240, 1244-45 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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was obtained through fraud. 51 In Medinol, the TYAB interpreted the
fraud standard to mean that an "applicant commits fraud in procuring a
registration when it makes material representations of fact in its declara-
tion which it knows or should know to be false or misleading." 1 5 2 Under
the proper standard, it is not enough that the applicant should know the
representation to be false or misleading; as explained by the court, an
applicant commits fraud in procuring a registration "only if [he] know-
ingly makes a false, material representation with the intent to the deceive
the PTO." 53
A false statement to the PTO, made because of an honest, even if un-
reasonable, misunderstanding, does not rise to the level of fraud. Bose,
in its 2001 application to renew its registration of WAVE, represented
that it was using the mark on audio tape recorders and players, when in
fact it had stopped making and selling these devices several years prior.
Bose did, however, continue to repair existing devices and ship them back
to customers, which it believed constituted continued use of the mark.
The TTAB held that Bose's repair and shipping activities were not "use
in commerce," that Bose's belief otherwise was unreasonable, and that
the representation that it used WAVE was fraud.154 The Federal Circuit
held that, although Bose made a false representation to the PTO, it
lacked the intent to deceive the PTO. 55 The reasonableness of Bose's
belief was irrelevant to the fraud analysis-"There is no fraud if a false
misrepresentation is occasioned by an honest misunderstanding or inad-
vertence without a willful intent to deceive."1 56 An applicant should still
take care in his statements to the PTO, as the court explicitly refused to
opine on whether a false statement made in reckless disregard of its truth
is paramount to fraud.' 57
B. MISDESCRIBING THE RELEVANT MARKET-IN RE SPIRITS
INTERNATIONAL
The Federal Circuit clarified that for a trademark to be denied registra-
tion for being "primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive"
under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(3), the mark must be likely to deceive a sub-
stantial portion of the relevant consuming population as to the origin of
the marked goods.158 For § 1052(e)(3) to bar registration, three criteria
must be met: (1) "the primary significance of the mark [is] a generally
known geographic location;" (2) a consumer is likely to mistakenly be-
lieve that the goods originated from, or are otherwise associated with, the
151. Id. at 1243 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3)).
152. Id. at 1244 (quoting Medinol, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1209).
153. Id. at 1245.
154. Id. 1242-43 (citing Bose Corp. v. Hexawave, Inc., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d 1332, 1333-38
(TTAB 2007)).
155. Id. at 1246.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1246 n.2.
158. In re Spirits Int'l, N.V., 563 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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location; and (3) the misdescription would be a material factor in the con-
sumer's decision to purchase the goods.159 Under In re Spirits Interna-
tional, the materiality criterion requires that "a substantial portion of the
relevant consumers is likely to be deceived."160
The ordinary American purchaser that would translate a foreign-lan-
guage mark under the doctrine of foreign equivalents does not necessa-
rily represent a substantial portion of the relevant population to trigger
§ 1052(e)(3). At the TTAB, the mark MOSKOVSKAYA was denied re-
gistration as primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive for
vodka that did not come from Moscow. Applying the doctrine of foreign
equivalents, the TTAB determined that the ordinary American consumer
would translate MOSKOVSKAYA into "of or from Moscow" and be
deceived into thinking that the vodka came from Moscow, a reputed
source of high-quality vodka. 161 Where the TTAB erred, however, was in
presuming that the segment of the relevant population that would trans-
late MOSKOVSKAYA, and thus be deceived as to the origin of the
vodka, represented a sufficient portion of that population to trigger a re-
gistration bar under § 1052(e)(3).162 On remand, the TTAB is to con-
sider whether the mark would deceive a substantial portion of the vodka-
consuming public-including Russian speakers who would be deceived
by the translated mark, and non-Russian speakers who would understand
MOSKOVSKAYA as denoting vodka that comes from Moscow.1 6 3
C. ADDING TO "USE IN COMMERCE"-RESCUECOM CORP. V.
GOOGLE, INC.
The influential U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit further
explained and expanded what type of Internet usage of a trademark may
constitute "use in commerce" necessary to trigger the civil-liability provi-
sions of the Lanham Act. In its 2005 opinion in 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v.
WhenUcom, Inc., the court held that a party is not liable for trademark
infringement under the Lanham Act absent a "use in commerce" of the
mark as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1127.21 Applying this definition, the
court determined that selecting and displaying a pop-up advertisement
based on the Internet user entering or selecting the website address of the
advertiser's competitor is not a "use in commerce."165 The court reached
this conclusion based in part on the fact that the trademark was not dis-
played to the public.166 The court stated that a purely internal use of a
trademark was analogous to a person's private thoughts about the mark
and that such conduct could not trigger liability under the Lanham
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1350-51.
162. Id. at 1356-57.
163. Id. at 1357.
164. 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 407 (2d Cir. 2005).
165. Id. at 409-12.
166. Id. at 409.
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Act.167 Lower courts in the Second Circuit have interpreted 1-800 Con-
tacts to mean that the internal use of trademarks as Internet-search
keywords or metatags is necessarily outside the definition of "use in com-
merce." 168 In Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., the Second Circuit ex-
plained that such an application of 1-800 Contacts is misplaced. 169
Selling a trademark as a keyword linked to an advertisement, as
Rescuecom accused Google of doing, qualified as a "use in commerce"
necessary to establish infringement. 170 The Second Circuit distinguished
1-800 Contacts by noting that in that case, the accused infringer linked the
advertisement to the website address containing the trademark, rather
than to the trademark itself, and did not sell triggering keywords to the
advertisers. 171 Google, on the other hand, allegedly displayed, recom-
mended, and sold the Rescuecom trademark to its advertisers. 172 This
use of the trademark satisfied the "use in commerce" definition of § 1127.
D. DECLARING A FIXED DESIGN-VANTAGE TRAILERS, INC. V.
BEALL CORP.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reiterated that the jus-
ticiability of a declaratory judgment action in a trademark case is deter-
mined as it would be in a patent or copyright case and requires that the
party seeking the judgment must have a substantially fixed and definite
design for the potentially infringing trademark.173 The court noted that
following MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., the justiciability test no
longer concerns whether the declaratory judgment plaintiff has a reasona-
ble apprehension of an infringement suit, but whether there is a "substan-
tial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of
sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory
judgment."174 Regardless of any threat of an infringement suit, absent a
substantially fixed design for the potentially infringing trademark, the
controversy is not sufficiently immediate and real.' 75
In requiring a substantially fixed design, the Fifth Circuit applied the
Federal Circuit's patent precedent requiring a fixed design with respect to
the potentially infringing aspects of the product.176 Here, the dispute was
over the appearance of bottom-dump trailers. Vantage Trailers, a manu-
facturer of bottom-dump trailers, filed the declaratory judgment action
after receiving a letter from a competitor, Beall, threatening legal action
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., Tiffany Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 499-500 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(listing cases discussing the issue).
169. Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 129-30 (2d Cir. 2009).
170. Id. at 130-31.
171. Id. at 128-29.
172. Id. at 129.
173. Vantage Trailers, Inc. v. Beall Corp., 567 F.3d 745, 749-50 (5th Cir. 2009).
174. Id. at 748 (quoting MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118,127 (2007)).
175. Id. at 750-51.
176. Id. at 749 (applying Sierra Applied Scis., Inc. v. Advanced Energy Indus., Inc., 363
F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
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if Vantage placed any trailers in service that violated Beall's trademark
rights in the appearance of the trailers. Although Vantage had begun to
manufacture the trailers, it continued to modify the appearance of the
trailers, even during the course of the litigation.' 77 The court reasoned
that the fixed design criterion is even more important in trademark,
which covers appearance, than in patent, which covers functionality.
"Because aesthetic changes can ordinarily be made far later in the design
process and with less expense than functional changes, trademark declar-
atory judgments raise a greater risk than patent declaratory judgments
that the design presented may have little relation to the design ultimately
produced and marketed."' 78 Even though threatened with legal action,
Vantage could not seek a declaratory judgment of non-infringement or
invalidity of Beall's trademark, because the potentially infringing aes-
thetic features of Vantage's trailer design were not sufficiently fixed to
establish justiciability.179
V. CONCLUSION
The courts' continued evolution of intellectual property law and the
perennial push for patent reform indicate the importance of intellectual
property to our economy. The billions of dollars at stake in patent in-
fringement actions support a well-reasoned evaluation of the patent laws,
including the propriety of damage awards. We should expect courts to
play an increased role in overseeing jury damage verdicts. Similarly, the
billions of dollars at stake, as well as the impact on the competitive land-
scape, warrants an increased scrutiny of the compulsory licensing
schemes of the Copyright Office, including the body tasked with estab-
lishing those licenses. As evidenced by the use of trademarks by Internet
search services such as Google, trademarks are taking on value in non-
traditional ways, and we will likely see trademark law evolve to account
for this new marketplace reality. Intellectual property jurisprudence will
continue to evolve and adapt as companies face new economic pressures
and opportunities based on their patents, trademarks, and copyrights.
177. Id. at 750.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 751.
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